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Introduction 
It is well known that Bertolt Brecht pronounced the 
contrast between the old and the new theatre he cre-
ated. At the turn of 1930/31, he remarked that “di-
alectic drama” would function “without psycholo-
gy”, “without the individual” and would “resolve 
states into processes in an emphatically epic way”.1, 2 
Artistic representations like the attempts by early 
sculptors to design “the essential,” “the eternal,” “the 
final,” in summary, “the soul of their models,”3 in 
Brecht’s opinion are among the “stage’s false repre-
sentations of social life”.4, 5 In contradistinction, the 
                                                            
1 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 3rd edition (edited by Marc 
Silberman, Steve Giles and Tom Kuhn, translations by Jack Davis, 
Romy Fursland, Steve Giles, Victoria Hill, Kristopher Imbrigotta, 
Marc Silberman and John Willett). London 2015, 57.  
2 Bertolt Brecht, Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter 
Ausgabe, Berlin‒Weimar‒Frankfurt/M 1989ff. (quoted as BFA) 
21, 439. 
3 BFA 22.1 (see note 2), 573. 
4 Brecht, London (see note 1), 229.  
5 Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke (quoted as GW), 
Frankfurt/M 1967, 661. 
experimental, critical, examining approach in the 
natural sciences becomes his ideal. On stage, “exper-
imental theatre” should capture societal conditions 
in such a way that they turned into recognisable and 
modifiable things, like objects of research. The anti-
psychologism as propagated in the initial quotations 
appears as a logical step in this approach. Yet still, 
Brecht is involved in psychological issues in an effort 
to evoke in his spectator “a kind of scientific atti-
tude”.6 He tries this not by decomposing psychology 
completely in the process but also by rethinking it as 
shown, for instance, by the following note in this 
journal of April 21, 1941: 
“The crisis of drama is profound. It is a matter of creating rich, 
complex, developing figures – without introspective psychology.”7 
, 8 
Progress is not in dissolution, but in complexity and 
in understanding more precisely developmental rela-
                                                            
6 Brecht, London (see note 1), 58; BFA 21 (see note 2), 440. 
7 Bertolt Brecht, Bertolt Brecht Journals (translated by Hugh 
Rorrison, ed. by John Willett), New York 1993, 143. 
8 BFA 26 (see note 2), 476. 
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2 
tions. What appears as a problem is then not psy-
chology per se, but introspective psychology.  
 Although some comments, like those quoted 
above, might suggest it, we do not find in Brecht a 
proponent of objectivist psychology. In the same 
way in which he rejects the psychological method of 
empathy, he criticises behaviorism, reading it as a 
symptom of capitalist conditions:   
“the normal behaviouristic images are very flat and blurred (if 
they do not have the clarity of scheme f). even when they include 
not only biological but also social reflexes, concrete figures seldom 
emerge. In the same way as c[apitalism] brings about the col-
lectivisation of man though deprivation and disindividualisation, 
and as at first a kind of ‘common ownership of nothing’ is 
brought into being by c[apitalism], so behaviourist psychology in 
the first instance reflects only society’s indifference to the individ-
ual, since the individual is a mere object.”9  
Thus, Brecht in no way advocates dissolution of the 
individual in processes. His psychologically im-
portant problem is the individual in his or her re-
lation to the mass as shown by the type of “collec-
tivisation,” as “depravation” and “dis-individualisa-
tion” in capitalism. It touches upon the processes of 
expropriation of common property and the loss of 
individuality of people dependent on their wages. In 
this way, he raises the question of what would be the 
psychological base of a different kind of sociality of 
human beings. The character of an individual as an 
object arising under capitalist conditions, as far as 
Brecht is concerned, oscillates between societal indif-
ference and an importance in which – as he puts it in 
a different context – “capitalism [...] invested all dili-
gence, all ingenium, all planning, all cruelty, all com-
petence into the production of mire.”10 The object 
status referred to is a status in which subjectivity is 
not removed but instrumentalised and employed 
productively. 
Brecht thus recognises the dominating function-
ality of psychology. However, as expressed above, he 
confronts this science not only with a destructive 
type of criticism. It is the psychology of his con-
temporary, Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), among others 
which he uses constructively in the 1930s. Its im-
portance to dialectic drama seems to be marginal 
because it is hardly referred to in Brecht’s writings. 
Yet, it can be shown that overlaps of Lewinian and 
Brechtian thought are not immaterial; the psycho-
logical concept of a field as developed by Lewin  
refers to the problem, also for Brecht, “to create im-
                                                            
9 Ibid. 
10 BFA 22 (see note 2), 536. 
proved representations of societal life of the people” 
and a new understanding of the “non-Aristotelian” 
causality expressed in it.11 
It is not possible, however, to detect precisely the 
influence of Lewin’s psychological ideas and science 
theory, as is evident from the very fact of their re-
ception. There is only one case proving that Brecht 
was familiar with a treatise by Lewin. At the time of 
Brecht’s trip to New York in 1937 he made a 
reference, ‚Die Auswahl der einzelnen Elemente‘,12 
to the early article of 1917 titled ‚Kriegslandschaft‘ 
[‚Landscape of War‘]. In that article, Lewin reflects 
upon his experience as a field artillery lieutenant – 
he had volunteered in 1914.13 His initially pheno-
menological description of the battle ground be-
comes a cornerstone of the psychology he develops 
in Berlin in the 1920s and early ‘30s. In his descrip-
tion of the 1917 war scenery, the interpretation of 
the situation at the front in the light of perceptual 
psychology becomes important: 
“It [the scenery, I.L] is relatively independent of the visibility 
conditions caused by the special shape of the terrain, extending 
far beyond the space which, in accordance with optical laws, the 
retina would be able to reflect even successively. What is impor-
tant for the scenery of peace is that this extension uniformly 
stretches into infinity in all directions [...]. The scenery is round, 
without a front or a rear side.” – “However, as you approach the 
front zone, extension into infinity is no longer true in the same 
sense. Towards the front, the scenery seems to end somewhere; 
the scenery is bounded. When marching towards the front, this 
boundedness of the scenery is apparent a considerable time before 
the front line becomes visible.”14  
Lewin describes the landscape in the sense of the 
phenomenological approach of his teacher, Carl 
Stumpf,15 and, at the same time, introduces a number 
of ideas which become significant for his field theory. 
                                                            
11 BFA 22 (see note 2), 387. 
12 BFA 22 (see note 2), 251-254. 
13 Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) studied philosophy (with Alois Riehl 
and Ernst Cassirer) in Berlin from 1910 and, later, psychology. He 
obtained his Ph.D. under Carl Stumpf. In 1921, he was appointed 
Assistant Lecturer, then Privatdozent and, 1927, Professor at the 
Psychological Institute in Berlin. Between 1926 and ‘34, actions 
and affects are the objects of Lewin’s studies. Having accepted a 
guest professorship in the USA as early as in 1932, he sought to 
find further employment at U.S. universities as a migrant in 1933. 
Groups and group dynamics became the central research topic in 
the period of emigration. It is only at this point that Lewin 
explicitly refers to his theory as field theory. 
14 Kurt Lewin, The Landscape of War, Art in Translation, Vol. 1, 
2, 2009, 199-209, here 201 (original work Kriegslandschaft 
published 1917). 
15 Helmut E. Lück, Einführung, in: Kurt Lewin. Schriften zur 
angewandten Psychologie: Aufsätze, Vorträge, Rezensionen, in H. 
E. Lück (Ed.). Wien 2009, 7-26, here 9. 
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3 
As he later argues, a psychological situation was 
always characterised by boundaries, positions, and 
movements in the field. Studying these would mean 
understanding how very specific tensions arise in the 
scenery which made people act in specific ways.16 A 
generalising explanation of human behaviour thus is 
found already in the war scenery. The battlefield 
becomes the model of a psychological field concept 
which is supplemented later by concepts borrowed 
from magnetism and the topological vector space in 
mathematics, but is sharply separated from a kind of 
physicalism. 
In 1937, Brecht notes about Lewin’s early 
treatise: 
“Psychology tells us that, depending on the use people make of a 
place, a different appearance is created.”17  
He establishes this proof (without exactly indicating 
the reference) in a handwritten footnote, probably 
when combining the different typed sections. 
 
Figure 1. Fig. 1: Brecht’s handwriting can be seen under-
neath the typewritten line (author’s photograph).18 
Brecht’s footnote is indicative of a reflection in 
perceptual psychology exceeding Lewin’s descrip-
tion. It contains the practical philosophical idea to 
read thinking “as social behavior,” i.e. referring to 
                                                            
16 In his essay, “Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur 
galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie“ (KLW 1,  
269) he borrows concepts of painting in order to explain the 
concept of situation: “The rôle of the situation in all these 
concepts may perhaps be best exhibited by references to certain 
chances in painting. In mediaeval painting at first there was, in 
general, no environment, but only an empty (often a golden) 
background. Even when gradually an ‘environment’ did appear it 
usually consisted in nothing more than presenting, beside the one 
person, other persons and objects. Thus the picture was at best an 
assembling of separate persons in which each had really a separate 
existence. Only later did the space itself exist in the painting: it 
became a whole situation. At the same time this situation as a 
whole became dominant, and each separate part, so far indeed as 
separate parts still remain, is what it is, for example, in such an 
extreme as Rembrandt, only in and through the whole situation.” 
(English: Lewin 1931, 173). 
17 BFA 22 (see note 2), 251. 
18 I am grateful to Jan Knopf for the permission to see the Brecht 
Archive “Arbeitsstelle Bertolt Brecht” in Karlsruhe. 
the “purpose it fulfills for the person thinking and 
for the person for whom thinking is done”.19 
Ulrich Sautter presumes the reception of another 
reference, the essay titled “Der Übergang von der 
aristotelischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biolo-
gie und Psychologie”20 [translated as The Conflict 
between Aristotelian and Galileian Modes of 
Thought in Contemporary Psychology] published in 
the first issue of the journal “Die Erkenntnis” (edited 
since 1930 by Rudolf Carnap and Hans 
Reichenbach):21 “That Brecht took cognizance of Le-
win’s ideas hardly seems to be doubtful.”22 However, 
this is not certain, as that issue of the publication is 
not contained in the Brecht Archive, only Issues 2-4 
(in one volume) with pages 80 to 339 being av-
ailable.23 An announcement of the article can be seen 
on one side of the jacket of a copy from the estate. At 
least the title is likely to have aroused Brecht’s 
attention.  
Both, Brecht and Lewin, are interested in the 
situative way of perception as a critical relation of a 
thinking and acting person to the world and to 
themselves. Both take up the problems of science 
theory of the time, which had become virulent 
against the backdrop of technically refined methods 
and new objects of perception in physics. Especially 
in treatises like ‚Gesetz und Experiment in der 
Psychologie‘ (1927) and in the essay referred to 
above, ‚Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur 
galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie‘ 
(1930/31),24 Lewin sets the course for a paradigm 
shift in his discipline in order to understand afresh 
laws governing human behavior and overcome the 
strict separation of science into natural science and 
humanities. Among other things, he introduces the 
event type concept looking for a link between a 
phenomenological and a mathematical approach.  
                                                            
19 BFA 21 (see note 2), 424. 
20 The text was written on the basis of a lecture by Lewin in Berlin 
on February 4, 1930. 
21 Rudolf Carnap/Hans Reichenbach (eds.), Die Erkenntnis, vol. 1, 
also "Annalen der Philosophie", vol. 9, 1930/31. 
22 Ulrich Sautter, Brechts logischer Empirismus, in: Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 45, 4, 1995, 687-709, here 701. 
23 I am grateful to Helgrid Streit of the Brecht Archive for the 
information and to Robert Cohen for the reference. 
24 Kurt Lewin, Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur 
galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie [The 
transition from Aristotelian to Galilean thinking in biology and 
psychology], in: Carl-Friedrich Graumann (Series Ed.)/Alexandre 
Métraux (Vol. Ed.), Kurt Lewin Werkausgabe: 
Wissenschaftstheorie, Stuttgart, Germany 1981, 233-278 (Original 
work published 1930/31). 
Journal of New Frontiers in Spatial Concepts | ISSN 1868-6648 | Vol. 9 (2017), 1-16 
 
This document is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0): 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en 
 
4 
Roughly at the same time, Brecht takes up prob-
lems of modern physics to articulate problems of the 
theatre: Societal processes and contradictions, mass 
movements, the behavior of the atomised individuals 
and their relations under capitalist conditions of 
production and ownership were to be made objects 
of experience and study although they defy imme-
diate descriptiveness and illustration.25 It is true that 
the “theatre for the scientific age”26 is to illustrate not 
the laws, but the historically important aspects of an 
event.27 However, like physics in quantum mechan-
ics, Brecht makes an effort to stage the social sit-
uation as a model or theory, respectively, because the 
capitalist production conditions would have caused 
a type of “injustice” which “had vanished entirely 
from the field of vision,”28 thus making it inaccessible 
to personal experience. The models are to challenge 
the spectator to think independently and, at the 
same time, arrive at new, critical, experimental ways 
of appropriation.29 Brecht seeks a type of perception 
which goes beyond mere empiricism; hence the 
instruction by the philosopher to the actors: “By the 
time you are through the audience ought to have 
seen even more than an eyewitness of the original 
incident.”30 And: “When you show that this is the 
                                                            
25 Jan Knopf, Bild des gesellschaftlich Verborgenen in den 
Dramen Brechts, in: Jan Knopf (ed.), Brecht-Journal. 
Frankfurt/M. 1983. 
26 Brecht, London (see note 1), 229; GW 16 (see note 5), 662. 
27 Cf.: “All characters I create are collectives. It is not for nothing 
that I instinctively think that it is necessary to look at all their 
situations from a historical point of view. I place the numbers of 
years even in the headlines above contemporary events. So, I fix 
the time in which this character appears. I thus reveal the 
situations unless they are created by that character. I think what 
he says is historical.” (BFA 22 (see note 2), 54). 
28 Brecht, London (see note 1), 55; BFA 21 (see note 2), 437. 
29 Cf.: The philosopher in Messingkauf: “It is not only problems 
that have been solved which the theater presents to its spectator, 
but it is also unsolved ones. By opposing a confusion of 
description one does not argue against a description of 
confusion.” (BFA 22 (see note 2), 721, not translated in: Bertolt 
Brecht, The Messingkauf Dialogues. Translated by John Willett. 
Reading: Methuen Drama (imprint of Reed Consumer Books) 
London 1994) Cf.: “Modern spectators, it was assumed, do not 
want so meekly succumb to a kind of hypnotic suggestion or to 
forfeit their reason by getting sucked into all sorts of emotional 
states. They do not want to be dictated to and violated – they just 
want to be presented with human material, and to be allowed to 
organize it themselves. For this reason they also like to see human 
beings in situations that are not clear from the outset, and for the 
same reason they do not need logical reasoning or psychological 
motivations like those of the old theatre.“ (Brecht 2015 (see note 
1), 58; BFA 21 (see note 2), 440). 
30 Brecht, London (see note 29), 55; GW 16 (see note 5), 582. 
way it is, show it in such a way that the audience will 
say: Is it really like that?”31 In the same way in which 
a natural scientist sees more after an experiment 
than before, for instance, by recognising a problem 
in a more defined or differentiated way, also the 
theater, as a place of experiments [dt. “Versuche” = 
attempts; experiments],32 is to change the perception 
first of the actors and then of the audience. In 
‚Messingkauf‘ [‚buying brass‘; ‚The Messingkauf Dia-
logues‘], the philosopher accordingly explains: 
“Science scans every field for openings for experiments and plastic 
representations of problems. They make models showing the 
movements of the planets; they make ingenious apparatuses to 
demonstrate how gases behave. They also experiment on people. 
But in this case the possibilities of demonstrating anything are ex-
tremely limited. So it stuck me that your art might serve to imitate 
people for the purpose of such demonstration. Incidents from 
people’s social life, demanding an explanation, could be imitated 
in such a way as to confront one with plastic representations 
whose lessons could be partically applied.”33  
The perception and recognition in which Brecht is 
interested thus resembles research in being mainly 
preliminary, in a state of development. This is the 
very fact which makes it useful because it stimulates 
to think in more experiments beyond what is exist-
ing and make predictions as in science. Thus, the 
philosopher in ‚Messingkauf‘ explains: 
“I ought to tell you that I have an insatiable curiosity about peo-
ple; it’s impossible for me to see and hear enough of them. […] I 
always want to know why they embark on their undertakings, and 
my aim is to distinguish certain laws that would allow me to make 
predictions.”34  
In 1931, Brecht planned to set up a “Marxist club” 
for “Marxist studies.” Whether the club ever met is 
not known.35 Kurt Lewin probably was among those 
who were to be invited into that group. Brecht 
composed a handwritten list on which the name can 
be found, although it is not quite legible. A different 
document shows the typed name of “Karl Lewin”.36 
Titles of presentations included ‚Das Weltbild der 
bürgerlichen Physik‘[‚The conception of the world 
of bourgeois physics‘] and ‚Behaviorismus (Psycho-
logie)‘.37 
                                                            
31 BFA 21 (see note 2), 390. 
32 Cf. Jan Knopf, Bertolt Brecht, Leipzig 2000. 
33 Brecht, London (see note 29), 35; BFA 22 (see note 2), 715. 
34 Brecht, London (see note 1), 17; BFA 22 (see note 2), 780. 
35 Erdmut Wizisla, Benjamin und Brecht. Die Geschichte einer 
Freundschaft, Frankfurt/M. 2004, 81. 
36 Wizisla, Frankfurt/M. (see note 35), 325-6. 
37 Wizisla, Frankfurt/M. (see note 35), 327. 
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5 
It is most likely that Brecht and Lewin met perso-
nally only as emigrants. In New York, in the spring 
of 1943, Brecht writes in an ironic, slightly depre-
cating tone: “a new acquaintance, kurt lewin who is 
working in iowa, teaching ‘leadership‘ to scouts and 
workers, and invites me to visit him, interested in 
‘baal the evil and asocial.’”38 This is an incomplete 
project of a Lehrstück, a didactic play. However, both 
men had been friends of Karl Korsch back in 
Berlin.39 Lewin has known him since his student 
days.40, 41 
Brecht and Lewin used the field concept to work 
on a similar problem, though in rather different ar-
eas. To what extent discussions in contemporary 
physics and philosophy influenced them can be seen 
in the next section. It will be shown whether Lewin’s 
psychological field concept has a different meaning 
to Brecht than that of physics. Moreover, traces will 
be followed which indicate that Brecht also knew 
Lewin’s treatise about the ‚Übergang der aristo-
telischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und 
Psychologie‘. This will also highlight ideas leading 
beyond Lewin which, transgressing the “individual 
psyche,” pave the way of a psychology of collective 
processes of learning and change. 
 
The Context of the 1930s 
The positivist tendencies in Logical Empiricism 
(Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath et 
al.) are important points of reference for both 
Brecht42, 43, 44 and Lewin45, 46. A point of special im-
portance to Lewin is the idea of one uniform science, 
                                                            
38 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 278. 
39 Sautter (see note 22), 701. 
40 Lewin and Karl Korsch together write the paper, “Mathematic 
Construct in Psychology and Sociology” for the 5th International 
Congress of Uniform Science, published 1939. (BFA 27 (see note 
2), 456). 
41 Cf. Karl Korsch, Gesamtausgabe: Briefe 1908-1939 (Vol. 8). Ed. 
by Michael Buckmiller/G. Langkau, Amsterdam 2001, 365. Unlike 
the Korsch edition, BFA indicates that Lewin “was close to the 
Berlin group of the Society of Empirical Philosophy where he had 
met Karl Korsch in 1930,“ (BFA 27 (see note 2), 456). 
42 Cf. Werner Hecht (ed.), Brecht 73, Berlin/DDR 1973.  
43 Sautter (see note 22). 
44 Kamil Uludag, Brechts Übertragungen aus den physikalischen 
Theorien, in: Institut für kritische Theorie (ed.), Brecht – Eisler – 
Marcuse. 100 Jahre. Hamburg 1999, 21-32. 
45 Kurt Lewin, Kurt Lewin Werke (quoted as KLW), Stuttgart 
1981ff. 
46 Cf. Notes partly by Lewin, partly by the editor, Alexandre 
Métraux, in Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur galileischen 
Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie in the complete edition 
about science theory, (KLW 1 (see note 45), 273-8). 
i.e. bridging the “radical dichotomy of natural scien-
ces and humanities.”47 In addition, the school of ge-
stalt theory (Wolfgang Köhler, Max Wertheimer et 
al.) influences his work. Lewin’s work is partly attri-
buted to that school although it by far transcends the 
framework of gestalt law studies. 
Common points of reference to Brecht and Le-
win in physics around 1930 are the discovery of 
quantum mechanics (Max Planck, Werner Heisen-
berg, Niels Bohr et al.) and the theory of relativity 
(Albert Einstein).   
 Max Planck in 1900 published the research pa-
per postulating that the energy of electromagnetic 
radiation is not released or absorbed by atoms in a 
uniform way but in leaps (quanta), the Planck Quan-
tum named after him. Consequently a physical sys-
tem, in a given harmonic oscillation, can accept or 
release energy only in discrete amounts, in integer 
multiples of the oscillation quantum. The concept of 
quantum object combines properties which previ-
ously were mutually exclusive in the paradigms of 
physics. The concept thus violates the fundamental 
principle of matter in classical physics.  
The atom, once indivisible, becomes divisible. In 
1913, Niels Bohr develops his atomic model in which 
electrons orbit around the atomic nucleus in shells. 
New equipment allows electrons to be observed. In 
1927, the famous double slit experiment is per-
formed in which interference patterns in need of 
explanation are produced because something can be 
either only particle or only wave, but not both at the 
same time. Quantum theory becomes the catalyst of 
a philosophical turn.  
However, even at an earlier point in time the 
field concept in physics cast doubt upon mechanical 
explanations based on material properties. Michael 
Faraday in 1845 made observations of polarized light 
under magnetic influence which he described by the 
term of “magnetic field.” In 1852, in the essay ‚On 
the Physical Character of the Lines of Magnetic 
Force‘48, he describes the way in which the magnetic 
field, unlike the gravitation field, had lines of force 
which could be enlarged, reduced and deflected as a 
function of the respective medium. He concluded 
that there had to be causes outside the material 
properties of the object under study. For an ex-
                                                            
47 KLW 1 (see note 45), 272. 
48 Michael Faraday, On the Physical Character of the Lines of 
Magnetic Force, in: Philosophical Magazine and Journal of 
Science vol. 3, No. 20. 1852, 401-427. 
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6 
planation one would have to study electromagnetic 
effects also in a perfect vacuum. As he did not have 
the possibilities to do so, he concluded that mod-
ifiable properties of “ether” determined the behavior 
of beams of light. In this way, his ether theory still 
falls back upon mechanical properties of a medium 
as the cause. In this way, the field concept can hardly 
be distinguished from the link between ether and 
space. It is only in Planck’s studies about heat 
radiation that the field concept came close to the 
modern systems concept.49 
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity achieved 
the breakthrough, imagining space as a function of 
the movement of matter. The assumption of field 
properties resulting from the relation among field 
elements supports the development of concepts of 
systems theory. Consequently, the field concept 
stands for a higher order to be determined theoret-
ically by specific relations, no longer solely by the 
elements and their inherent characteristics.  
Werner Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Relation 
(1927) expresses the insight that simultaneous exact 
measurements of position and momentum of an 
electron are mutually exclusive. According to Hei-
senberg, this relation can be explained on the basis 
of the properties of a quantum or, to put it different-
ly, from the problem that the position in space of an 
electron can be measured only by exposing it to 
light, i.e. by influencing the oscillation of the elec-
tron. As the position of the electron can be deter-
mined the more accurately the shorter the wave-
length of light, he concludes, any measurement af-
fected the movement of the electron. Heisenberg 
assumes that the uncertainty of the measurement 
was unavoidable because shorter light waves also en-
hanced the recoil by which a deflected photon acted 
on the electron. Consequently, higher precision of 
the determination of position at the same time re-
duced in the determination of velocity. However, 
from a present-day vantage point, the assumption of 
a direct relation between the measurement process 
and uncertainty is doubtful.50  The indirect way of 
                                                            
49 http://www.physikdidaktik.uni-karlsruhe.de/altlast/14.pdf. 
50 In the meantime, the Uncertainty Relation has been interpreted 
differently in physics. Experiments allowing the inextactness in 
measurement to be calculated from the difference between a weak 
and a normal measurement have shown uncertainty to occur not 
in the way assumed by Heisenberg. Uncertainty is preserved as a 
fact, but is no longer attributed primarily to the disturbance of the 
electron by a photon arbitrarily directed at it. (Scharf, 2012). In: 
Rainer Scharf, Der große Heisenberg irrte, in: Frankfurter 
discovery, which must fall back on technical equip-
ment and theoretical thinking because of the type of 
research object, again is seen as a problem of unat-
tainable independence of the measurement pro-
cedure and the system to be measured. 
 
Adaptations in Brecht 
Uncertainty, i.e. that “the process of observation has 
altered what is being observed“51 is interpreted by 
Brecht not as a shortcoming of science or of method-
ology but turned around as confirmation of the 
philosophical insight that “things can be recognized 
by changing them.“52 The Uncertainty Relation be-
comes a formula for the relation in development of 
practical and mental action. It is a pattern of thought 
repeatedly occurring in Brecht’s writings. Thus, the 
philosopher in ‚Messingkauf‘ asks:  
“The physicists tell us that in studying the smallest particles of 
matter they suddenly had suspected that the materials studied had 
been changed by the study. Besides the motions they observe un-
der their microscopes there are motions caused by the micro-
scopes. On the other hand, also the instruments probably are al-
tered by the objects on which they are focused. This happens 
when instruments observe; what will happen once people ob-
serve?”53  
Concentrating on the subjects’ ability to learn and 
act, Brecht alludes to Heisenberg also in defining 
“intervening thinking.” Preference should be given 
to “those definitions which allow the defined field to 
be handled:” “The determining factors always 
include the behavior of the defining party.”54 In this 
way Brecht, like Lewin’s phenomenological reflec-
tion on the war scenery, emphasizes the dependence 
on the subject and on practice of the respective field 
concept. Brecht also takes up the ideas of a physical 
field or space which is no longer absolute but exists 
in relation to the elements it incorporated: 
“The physicists working on relativity make the qualities of space 
depend on the distribution of matter. I am incapable of reading 
sentences like these without thinking of something like ‘social 
space’.”55  
                                                                                        
Allgemeine Zeitung, Beilage: Naturwissenschaft, November 17, 
2012. Available online: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wissen/physik-
chemie/quantenphysik-der-grosse-heisenberg-irrte-
11959435.html. 
51 Brecht, London (see note 29), 50; BFA 22.2 (see note 2), 730. 
52 BFA 21 (see note 2), 425. 
53 Brecht, London (see note 29), 50; BFA 22.2 (see note 2), 730. 
54 Transl. by RF; GW 20 (see note 5), 168. 
55 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 188; Jan. 7, 1942, BFA 27 (see 
note 2), 45. 
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7 
The problem of uncertainty, insurmountable by 
method or technology, at that time also gave rise to 
thinking in science theory about handling studies in-
volving many laws acting at the same time. In view 
of these laws of nature superimposed upon each 
other in a complex pattern, which do not allow to be 
found out in detail what was the cause and what was 
the effect, the solution of a linear, absolute idea of 
cause and effect is given up in favor of a structural, 
statistical solution. Brecht’s Me-Ti discusses this 
question, moving indetermination of quantum phy-
sics experiments into the vicinity of stubbornness in 
human behavior: 
“Physics just now is finding out that the smallest bodies are in-
calculable, their movements unpredictable. They seem to be in-
dividuals endowed with a free will of their own. Their move-
ments, therefore, are difficult or impossible to predict because 
there are too many determinations for us, not none at all.”56  
Brecht recognizes that the field concept is relevant in 
solving this problem. However, the discovery of a 
field is not an end in itself. It becomes important 
because familiarity with properties of the field allows 
individual cases to be explained as well. However, 
the explanation remains vague, within the frame-
work or ‘statistical causality:’57  
“‘The world has been fully determined’ is a sentence devoid of 
meaning as it does not apply to human beings.” – “The question 
of determinism or indeterminism is completely hopeless. If every-
thing which happens is predetermined, then the chains of deter-
mination are infinite, and we cannot have an overview of endless 
chains. Total determination is impossible.”58  
In a way, Brecht follows the “scandal of quantum 
mechanics” that “although the system is fully known, 
only probabilities can be predicted,”59 emphasizing: 
“At any rate, the probability causality of physicists allows some 
statements to be made even about irregular and complex 
events.”60  
Brecht is inspired by the reference to probabilities 
because he thinks they may be useful in his dramas. 
In this way, the tendency of everyday reasoning and 
pseudo-scientific thinking to explain visible behavior 
of persons in a way duplicating it from their respec-
tive assumed inner characters, is to be irritated and 
overcome. Brecht hopes to arouse an awareness in 
                                                            
56 Transl. by RF; GW 12 (see note 5), 568. 
57 Cf. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Philosophieren mit Brecht und 
Gramsci, Hamburg 1996, 54. 
58 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 211; March 23, 1942; BFA 27 
(see note 2), 71-2. 
59 Uludag, Hamburg (see note 44), 28. 
60 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 211; ibid. 
the mind of his audience of the fact that “not only 
the relations between persons” became processes, 
but also “persons themselves.”61 At the same time, 
however, he turns against the affirmation of this dis-
solution of people in processes, demonstrating the 
incompetence of psychology by this very fact: 
“That which had been indivisible – the individual – disintegrated 
into its component parts, and this produced the psychology that 
examined the parts but naturally failed to put them back together 
again to make an individual.”62  
However, this criticism does not apply to Kurt Le-
win’s psychology. How it may have inspired Brecht 
in a demonstrable way, therefore, merits closer exa-
mination.  
 
The Field Concept – Its Importance in Lewin’s 
Psychology and in Brecht’s Theater 
References to Gestalt Theory in Lewin 
In Wertheimer,63 the field concept includes struc-
tures of the field of vision. “A homogeneous field,” 
for instance, appeared like a white surface, “a whole 
field resisting ‘division,’ ‘disruption,’ ‘interruption.’” 
Only the discontinuity of a figure–ground relation 
aroused attention to something: 
“Dissemination of attention, fixation etc., under natural 
conditions are caused secondarily by the constellations in the 
whole, [...] again primarily as a function of the ‘main distribution’. 
Any artificial shift in the range of attention may give rise to 
different, new field conditions.”64  
In this way, the field concept can be used for gen-
eralized studies of arrangements of elements to see 
whether they result in the perception of a shape or 
gestalt.    
Lewin handles similar problems of perceptive 
psychology, e.g., when referring to things with “the 
character of an invitation” (“Aufforderungscharak-
ter”) or, in a stronger expression, to “imperative en-
vironmental facts”.65 This means that things in a per-
son’s field of vision are rarely seen as neutral, but 
sometimes as interesting, sometimes as repulsive to 
somebody. So, the concept is both phenomenolog-
ical, in the sense of a specific descriptive category of 
experience, and theoretical by referring to the rela-
                                                            
61 Transl. by RF; BFA 21 (see note 2), 320. 
62 Brecht, London (see note 1), 54; BFA 21 (see note 2), 435. 
63 Max Wertheimer, Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt, 
in: Psychologische Forschung, 4, 1. 1923, 301-50, here 347-9. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Kurt Lewin, A Dynamical Theory of Personality, New York 
1935, 77. 
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8 
tion between usefulness perceived in a situation and 
attractiveness of an object. Lewin interprets this re-
lation in terms not just of perceptual psychology but 
also of behavioral psychology as a specific relation 
between a person and the environment. The change 
in behavior and the switch into an action initially ap-
pearing attractive up to the point of saturation and 
oversaturation, after which an action is interrupted 
or even stopped entirely, is a typical example of his 
research in the late 1920s. He will later construe his 
field concept with a view to these spontaneous pat-
terns of evaluation and prove these by concepts of 
physics, vectors and valences. In this case, they are in 
the service of the “principle of specific causes,” i.e. 
that “only existing facts can influence behavior.” 
This rejects concepts of the “older association theo-
ry,” which frequently responds to “the question: 
‘Why does a person behave in this or that way?’ by 
referring to a similar kind of behavior in the on-
togenetic or phylogenetic past of that person.”66 
Lewin in this way seeks to emphasize a strict se-
paration between historical and topological explana-
tions, defining the latter by the postulate that “only 
the present state of a person influences the present 
behavior of that person” and, consequently, only ex-
act investigation of the “specific dynamic properties 
of the then present living space” allowed conclusions 
to any laws to be drawn.67 He finally transfers ideas 
of this kind to the psychological field of group 
dynamics.  
A letter written by Korsch in 1937 advises Lewin 
against using theorems of gestalt theory when ana-
lyzing dynamic units, i.e. the dynamic relations in 
groups. He draws his attention to inaccuracies in his 
line of arguments by pointing out that Lewin, on the 
one hand, referred to “dynamic units of various de-
grees” as “gestalten of greater or less unity,” but then 
failed to take into account more accurately the dif-
ferences in degree as a function of the type of 
communication: “The type of communicating pro-
cess not only defines the degree but also the ex-
istence of communication.”68, 69 This shows the basic 
problem in systems theory whether the unit or the 
                                                            
66 Kurt Lewin, Psychoanalyse und Topologische Psychologie, in: 
Kurt Lewin, Schriften zur Angewandten Psychologie, Aufsätze, 
Vorträge, Rezensionen, 121-130. In Helmut Lück (Ed.). Wien 
2009 (Original work published 1936), here 123-4. 
67 Lewin, Wien (see note 66), 125. 
68 Korsch, Amsterdam (see note 41), 633. 
69 The letter to Kurt and Gertrud Lewin was written in Seattle and 
dated May 3, 1937. 
structure of a whole produced out of elements can be 
derived in a dominant way either as a structure (ge-
stalt / system) or as a process (communication). 
Korsch draws attention to the interaction between 
the two. Only when, seen structurally, two elements 
are coupled to each other, degrees of uniformity of a 
whole may differ. This is important in a theory of so-
cial conflicts.  
 Korsch also argues that “your ‘gestalten of 
greater or less unity’ [...] no longer were covered in 
any way by the definition that ‘a change of one part 
results in a change in all other parts.’” This ‘all’, he 
criticizes, had a “non-verifiable, mystic” effect, con-
tradicting its “distinction of degrees of dynamic 
unity.”70 So there seems to be a conflict between two 
perspectives of insight in the gestalt concept. On the 
one hand, there are dynamic changes explaining 
how a unit as a gestalt (as a whole) is formed but can 
also be dissolved again (partly) (perspective of emer-
gence); on the other hand, the unit is to explain the 
strength of dependencies or relations in a field and 
the resultant consecutive processes (perspective of 
systemic consequences). The ‘unverifiable’ thus 
would be the attempt to ascribe to the structure of a 
field as a whole a power which is determining com-
pared to all the elements contained in it (structural 
determinism). The idea of a fully determined system 
is contained in this argument. It contradicts the in-
sight that dynamics also can destroy and surpass a 
specific system on which they are based. 
In Lewin’s essay on the “Übergang von der 
aristotelischen zu galileischen Denkweise in Biologie 
und Psychologie” the problem emphasized by 
Korsch does not yet appear. It deals with the prob-
lem of cause and effect from a psychological point of 
view, initially paving the way for a non-Aristotelian 
understanding of causality. If Brecht learned about 
Lewin’s contribution through Korsch or through the 
ad on the back of a journal, it is most likely to have 
aroused his interest. 
 
The First Volume of “Die Erkenntnis“ and Lewin’s 
Contribution 
The journal ‚Annalen der Philosophie‘ was pub-
lished 1930/31 under the new title ‚Die Erkenntnis‘: 
In this first issue, Reichenbach emphasizes that it 
was the duty of science, philosophy in particular, to 
“combine in a uniform view of the world scientific 
                                                            
70 Korsch, Amsterdam (see note 41), 633. 
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discoveries and the world of daily life.”71, 72 For, 
“when philosophers mentioned discoveries like the 
relativistic theory of time, non-Euclidean shapes of 
space, quantum mechanical bounding of the causal-
ity principle, referring to them as working hypo-
theses or fiction, they drew [a] line,” attributing to 
“science a special status”.73 Empiricism and develop-
ment of a theory was separated by the philosophical 
task of establishing links which were not purely 
speculative in nature. Against this backdrop, Carnap 
explained the need for a uniform science. 
“This is [...] the source of [an] unfortunate schism, and anybody 
not trained in scientific thought will not be able to overcome it, 
despite all his brave need to learn, unless philosophy has first 
shown the way towards unity.”74  
In ‚Wege der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung‘,75 
Otto Neurath defined as one of its “fundamental 
insights” that “there are only practical boundaries, 
not those of principle, between the different areas of 
science.”76 In the words of Hahn, Carnap, and Neu-
rath, logical empiricism rejects the “dark distances 
and unfathomable depths” of the metaphysical def-
inition of life.77 Carnap, in his contribution ‚Die alte 
und die neue Logik‘ (old and new logic) wants to 
extend “predicate logic” into a “logic of relations,” 
because the former was able to indicate only one 
cause.78, 79  
                                                            
71 Carnap/Reichenbach (see note 21), 50. 
72 Reichenbach writes about the program of the journal: “This 
journal is not interested in learned opinions, theoretical systems, 
concepts, but only Erkenntnis (insight). ‘Erkenntnis’ is a journal 
of scientific philosophy. It is not restricted to the methods of one 
philophical system, it does not see philosophy based on an 
individual right of reason which, independent of specific scientific 
branches, could erect findings of a generally binding nature, but 
intends to conduct philosophy in accordance with the methods of 
individual sciences, without any prejudice of an overarching 
insight but, a priori, only on the basis of the issues posed by 
specific problems. The format of this journal is the given 
expression of this philosophy in which individual problems must 
be solved irrespective of the framework posed by a system, and in 
which insights gained by many authors will be combined to erect 
an overall science, which is interested in ‘insights’ in the same 
sense as any other specific science” (Carnap/Reichenbach (see 
note 21), 50). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 50-51. 
75 The copy left by Brecht contains parts underlined and 
commented on by Brecht in the article by Neurath. 
76 Otto Neurath, Wege der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, 
1930/31 (see note 21), 313-4. 
77 Hans Hahn/Otto Neurath/Rudolf Carnap, Wissenschaftliche 
Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, Vienna 1929, 15. 
78 Rudolf Carnap, Die alte und die neue Logik, 1930/31 (see note 
21), 18, cited from Sautter (see note 22), 698-9. 
 Lewin addresses the same problem in psychol-
ogy. Alexandre Métraux, editor of the first volume of 
Kurt Lewin’s works remarks: The uniform science 
concept meant more to Lewin [...] than the, certainly 
correct, assertion that all sciences in the same way 
consist of ‘conceptual’ material;” instead, the “radical 
dichotomy of natural sciences and humanities was to 
be abolished.”80  
For this purpose, Lewin concentrates on 
“problems of dynamics” which allow the “ponderable 
differences in the modes of thought” in the physics 
of Galileo and Aristotle to emerge.81 To him, the 
deficiency in Aristotelian physics lies in it attributing 
to an object a character by classification, in this way, 
“explaining its behavior in positive and negative re-
spects”.82 Aristotelian “classification often took the 
form of paired opposites, such as cold and warm, dry 
and moist, and compared with present-day classifi-
cation had a rigid, absolute character”.83 His con-
cepts were “anthropomorphic,” “inexact” illustra-
tions.84 Aristotelian physics thus “occup[ies] a place 
between valuative and nonvaluative concepts: the 
highest forms of motions are circular and rectilinear, 
and they occur only in heavenly movements, those 
of the stars; the earthly sublunar world is endowed 
with motion of inferior types.”85  
Instead of absolute opposites, Lewin finds in 
modern physics fluid transitions because “‘concepts 
of substance’ have been replaced by ‘concepts of 
function.’”86 Aristotelian concepts of substance per-
formed an abstraction of the type when general-
ization at the same time implied leaving out par-
ticular differences. In contradistinction to this, “with 
[…] ‘functional concepts’ it is possible to go from 
the particular to the general without losing the par-
ticular in the general and thereby making impossible 
                                                                                        
79 Carnap’s interest corresponds to Lewin’s demand for functional 
concepts and to Brecht’s interest in overcoming a one-
dimensional causality idea – described in predicate logics as 
follows: “If each sentence ascribes one predicate to one subject, 
there can basically only be one subject, namely the absolute 
subject, and every situation must see to it that the absolute is 
assigned a specific predicate.” (Carnap 1930/31 (see note 21/78), 
18, cited from Sautter (see note 22), 698-9). 
80 KLW 1 (see note 45), 272, fn. 3. 
81 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 141; KLW 1 (see note 45), 234. 
82 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 144; KLW 1 (see note 45), 236. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 142. 
85 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 142; Lewin, New York (see note 65), 
3; KLW 1 (see note 45), 235-6. 
86 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 144. 
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the return from the general to the particular”. 87 In 
the Aristotelian mode of thought, to rise to gen-
erality one was compelled to “either limit oneself to a 
narrow object range or, when expanding the range, 
more and more to dilute the concepts.”88 In this way, 
Aristotle can only encompass “as laws” and [...] con-
cepts “what happens without exception” and, more-
over, what “occurs frequently;” the criterion of a law 
is “frequency” and “regularity,” “with which identi-
cal events occur in nature”.89 “Lawfulness” as equiva-
lent to “the highest degree of generality”, was inter-
preted “as the extreme case of regularity”.90 Thus, 
“excluded from the class of the conceptually intel-
ligible” were “those things which occur only once, in-
dividual events as such”.91, 92 Consequently, the “sin-
gle event becomes […] unlawful in principle because 
there is no way of investigating its dynamics.”93 
While the concepts in Aristotelian physics were 
in their “original connection,” referring to ‘reality’ 
“in the special sense of the given historic-geographic 
circumstances”,94 new physics altered this concept of 
empiricism: “The same law governs the courses of 
the stars, the falling of stones, and the flight of 
birds.”95 A “functional way of thinking” superseded 
the conceptual grid of Aristotelian classes, instead 
operating with “conditional-genetic concepts”.96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
87 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 169; Lewin, New York (see note 65), 
35. 
88 KLW 1 (see note 45), 236; not translated in the English article. 
89 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 145; KLW 1 (see note 45), 237. 
90 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 146; KLW 1 (see note 45), 238. 
91 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 144; KLW 1 (see note 45), 237.  
92 Cf. Aristoteles, Poetik, griechisch/deutsch, übersetzt von 
Manfred Fuhrmann, Leipzig 1994, 28-30. 
93 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 164; KLW 1 (see note 45), 261. 
94 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 147; KLW 1 (see note 45), 239. 
95 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 148; Lewin, New York (see note 65), 
10; KLW 1 (see note 45), 243. 
96 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 149; Lewin, New York (see note 65), 
11; KLW 1 (see note 45), 241. 
To Aristotle Galileo 
1. The regular  
is the frequent 
 
 
 
the individual 
    
 the law 
 
 
     random 
 
 
    the law 
 
 
2. Criteria of a 
law are 
regularity 
frequency 
There is no need 
for special criteria 
3. Historico-
geographic 
cases have in 
common 
an expression of the 
essence of a cause 
‘accident’ (caused 
only historically) 
Figure 2. Table 197  
With Aristotle, conceptualization did not meet the 
problems of a complex dynamic occurrence.  
“A leading characteristic of Aristotelian dynamics is the fact that 
events are explained by means of concepts which we today per-
ceive to be specifically ‘biological’ or psychological: every object 
tends, so far as not prevented by other objects, toward perfection, 
toward the realization of its own nature. This nature is for 
Aristotle […] that which is common to the class of the object. So 
it comes about that the class for him is at the same time the con-
cept and the goal (telos) of an object.”98  
As a consequence, Aristotelian concepts described 
relations merely in such a way that 
“quite generally, the cause of a physical event is akin to psycho-
logical ‘drives’: the object strives toward a certain goal; so far as 
movement is concerned, it tends toward the place appropriate to 
its nature. Thus, heavy objects strive downward, the heavier the 
more strongly, while light objects strive upward.”99  
In this case, the dynamics of events can be repre-
sented only by a single vector while modern physics 
studies the “coexistence of several physical facts,” i.e. 
“the relation of an object to its environment.”100 The 
method of discovery must no longer search for 
lawfulness “characterized by the idea of always eter-
nal”101 and exclude the influences of the “situation” 
in which the object is found but must describe it in 
precise conceptual terms. “It refers to the overall si-
tuation in its full, concrete individuality, i.e. the exis-
tence of the situation at every moment in time.“102 
For this reason, experiments had to meet a very dif-
                                                            
97 Lewin 1931 (see note 24); KLW 1 (see note 45), 278. 
98 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 163; KLW 1 (see note 45), 258. 
99 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 163; KLW 1 (see note 45), 258. 
100 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 164; KLW 1 (see note 45), 259. 
101 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 147; KLW 1 (see note 45), 240. 
102 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 168, KLW 1 (see note 45), 264. 
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ferent objective. In the interest of theory develop-
ment, they no longer should try to reproduce only 
identical processes. Mere reproduction, Lewin states, 
can neither confirm nor contradict a theory. Instead, 
experiments had to produce a ‘“pure’ […] type of 
process” in order to be able to “reconstruct” laws 
conceptually.103 In this context, it was “important to 
construct such situations as will actually yield this 
‘pure’ event” or in which it can be reconstructed 
conceptually from actual events.104 The empirical 
frequency or regularity of an event as well as the 
“‘average’ situation” are irrelevant to this issue.105 
Laws can only be described by conditional-genetic 
concepts. Historico-geographic concepts should be 
added in order to elucidate an event above and be-
yond its conditions not constituting a law. This is the 
“transition from an abstract classificatory procedure 
to an essentially concrete constructive method”.106 
Consequently, psychological research becomes 
able to study human actions only in relation to the 
context of a situation. In other words, the “dynamics 
of the process is always to be derived from the relation 
of the concrete individual to the concrete situation, 
and, as far as internal forces are concerned, from the 
mutual relations of the various functional systems 
that make up the individual.”107 All forces (vectors) 
and “process differentials”108 acting in these concepts 
were important to the generation of a theory. After 
all, it was not only the forces within a situation 
which changed but, “the whole situation changed 
with the process, thus changing also the vectors that 
at each moment determine the dynamics, in both 
their strength and direction”.109 In this reference 
(not only to physics but also) to gestalt psychology, 
Lewin refrains from wanting to explain persons by 
means of a “law of average behavior” or referring to 
them as determined by their environment.110 The 
psychological concept of law must be anchored in 
the concept of a type of event. For this purpose, 
Lewin proposes to repeat experiments and, in order 
to determine the type of event, vary them 
systematically and focus on the “process 
                                                            
103 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 169; KLW 1 (see note 45), 264. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Lewin 1931 (see note 24),172; 175; KLW 1 (see note 45), 268. 
106 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 175; KLW 1 (see note 45), 271. 
107 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 174; KLW 1 (see note 45), 270. 
108 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 167; KLW 1 (see note 45), 262. 
109 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 167; KLW 1 (see note 45), 263. 
110 not translated in the English article, KLW 1 (see note 45), 268. 
differentials”.111 As he writes in ‚Gesetz und 
Experiment in der Psychologie‘, it was not identical 
events which were important, but different cases 
because 
“the determination of an empirical type, especially if it involves a 
conditional-genetic type of an object or event, cannot be achieved 
by intuition of its essence (Wesensschau) (nor can it be done by 
direct perception). Rather, such a determination can only come 
about by investigating the dynamic constitutive factors, an in-
vestigation that can be accomplished only by changing real 
events.”112, 113 
In this way, the concept of law incorporates the 
conditional-genetic conditions, i.e. causality as a mat-
ter of necessary consequences, while the “historico-
geographic sphere” only elucidate why, e.g., a partic-
ular kind of event is frequent or rare in specific 
situations, i.e. the probability of phenomena.114 Le-
win, in this conclusion, separates levels in a similar 
way in which contemporary physics does. 
As there are limits to the controllability of physi-
cal systems in experimental situations, science must 
find a way beyond direct perception. Empirical work 
must be conducted indirectly and theoretically, re-
spectively, by contrasting planned interventions into 
a complex system with an outcome. Yet, “events that 
are phenotypically very similar can be very different 
in terms of their conditional-genetic type. Vice 
versa, identical or highly similar events with respect 
to their conditional-genetic type can belong to 
different phenotypes.”115 The relation between the 
theoretical level and the evidence level is less natural 
requiring, as it does, an independent philosophical 
frame of thought. In an essay published posthu-
mously about Ernst Cassirer’s contribution to sc-
ience philosophy, Lewin again focuses on this prob-
lem: “In physics, a corresponding change occurs on 
the basis of an increasingly closer interdependence 
of fact findings and theory.”116 Recurring again to 
Cassirer’s treatise about Substanzbegriff und Funk-
tionsbegriff published in 1910, he draws attention to 
the need for a reflected connection of theoretical 
work and indirect method: 
“No physicist in actual fact experiments and measures with the 
individual instrument he has in front of his eyes but, in his mind, 
bases it on an ideal tool in which all random defects necessarily 
attached to a special tool are excluded. If, for instance, we measure 
                                                            
111 Lewin 1931 (see note 24), 167; KLW 1 (see note 45), 264-5. 
112 Kurt Lewin, Gesetz und Experiment in der Psychologie, 1992, 395. 
113 KLW 1 (see note 45), 291. 
114 Lewin 1992 (see note 112), 392; KLW 1 (see note 45), 288. 
115 Lewin 1992 (see note 112), 400; KLW 1 (see note 45), 297. 
116 Transl. by RF; KLW 1 (see note 45), 353. 
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the intensity of an electric current by means of the tangent galva-
nometer method, the observations we initially make with one 
specific apparatus must be related and transferred to a general 
geometric model before they can be used physically.”117  
Consequently, it would be necessary “to develop bet-
ter concepts and theories at higher levels”.118 Finally, 
Lewin once again summarizes the parallels between 
his psychological approach and 20th-century phy-
sics, in this way clearly revealing not only the in-
fluence of Cassirer but also that of gestalt theory: 
“Logically speaking, there is no reason to distinguish between the 
reality of a molecule, an atom or an ion or, more generally, 
between the reality of a whole or that of its parts. [...] Both in the 
social and the physics areas, the structural properties of a dynamic 
whole differ from the structural properties of the parts. Both sets 
of properties must be investigated. When one is important and 
when the other, depends on the question to be answered. How-
ever, there is no difference in terms of reality between the two.”119  
To Lewin, this methodological insight establishes the 
unity of sciences. He interprets the validity of theo-
retico-conceptual insights in a similar way in which 
Brecht defines it praxeologically, i.e. as a practical re-
lation to the world, which ultimately constitutes the 
basis of the respective problems of insight: “The 
reality of what the concept refers to is given by the 
fact that you use it to do something with it, and not 
by the fact that you just look at it.”120  
 
Hints to the Use of Lewin’s Contributions by 
Brecht 
Although it is uncertain whether Brecht read ‚Die 
Erkenntnis‘ from the very first issue, it can be as-
sumed that he learned about Lewin’s arguments and 
studies in discussions with Korsch. There are some 
references in Brecht’s theoretical writings, such as 
“The Causality of Non-Aristotelian Drama,” which 
seem to relate to Lewin’s contribution. 
“The celestial orbits, as we are told, do not constitute the most 
perfect circles or ellipses. The true mode of motion of celestial 
bodies is approached most closely by imagining them as creeping 
within huge tubes, these tubes being mathematical figures, while 
the stars enjoy a lot of freedom within them, and they use it.”121  
Brecht in this case not only alludes to statistical 
causality but possibly also to the unscientific conclu-
sion of Aristotelian physics, criticized by Lewin, that 
celestial bodies – unlike terrestrial ones – had to 
                                                            
117 Transl. by RF; ibid. 
118 KLW 1 (see note 45), 354. 
119 KLW 1 (see note 45), 356. 
120 KLW 1 (see note 45), 358. 
121 BFA 22 (see note 2), 395. 
move in “perfect circles or ellipses”. In the same 
writing, Brecht potentially takes up another argu-
ment by Lewin relating to universal causality in re-
lation to single events as a matter of recognizing hig-
her scientific standards (‘intensified claims’). Like 
Lewin, he rejects ‘average behavior’ and a superficial 
assessment of the mass influencing the individual, 
thus clarifying the aim to make the audience able to 
perceive both, the influence of the environment and 
the striving of a particular individual: 
“We would be missing something [of the individual, I.L.], 
something individual, if it followed the laws of motion of the mass 
too smoothly which, to him, would be the special case. Does this 
mean that we no longer want to deal with the individual, become 
resigned, no more define or want to ascertain any causality with 
it? Not at all. We merely intensified our claims. […] In specific 
situations, we must expect more than one response, reaction, 
mode of action, a ‘Yes’ and a ‘No’; both must appear to be based 
on motives. The attention, the causal interest, of the spectator 
must be attuned to the laws inherent in the movements of masses 
of individuals. The spectator must see such masses behind the 
individuals, individuals being considered as mass particles in a 
mass-like reaction, action, development.”122  
Another reference makes Brecht’s criticism of the 
average concept even clearer; at the same time, how-
ever, it is supported by a criticism of generalizations 
which use “larger units, such as classes” for causality 
relations, thus merely duplicating by affirmation the 
lack of power of the individual. This is reminiscent 
of Lewin’s rejection of classifications which, for in-
stance, seek to explain individual behavior as “being 
determined by the environment,” while they are 
merely abstracting from a special situation. This is 
where Brecht’s criticism of affirmative psychology 
comes in: 
“The disparity between the quantity of influences and the small 
size of the human beings adapting to them, which is expressed in 
the uncertainty and lack of importance of the consequences of 
human actions, is excessive. […] The ‘average’ in reality is only a 
theoretical line and, consequently, no single individual is really an 
average person. The utter lifelessness of the type, its cheapness, 
wrongness, lack of life is notorious.”123  
Certainly, none of this is a reliable reference allowing 
one to assume that Brecht had been familiar with 
Lewin’s contribution to ‚Die Erkenntnis‘. There is 
however another hint with greater impact where he 
proposes that “we should refer to the individual case 
occurring in a drama as such” (as a singular event) 
and “again and again indicate its deviations from the 
‘lawful’.”124 Having read Lewin, we recognize here a 
                                                            
122 BFA 22 (see note 2), 396. 
123 BFA 22 (see note 2), 692. 
124 BFA 22 (see note 2), 388. 
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key principle of his psychology to derive insights not 
from confirmation by frequencies but from the ‘pro-
cess differentials‘ of systematically varied situations.  
 
Field Theory with Lewin 
A “basic characteristics of field theory in psychol-
ogy” was incorporated in “the demand […to de-
scribe] the field which influences an individual […] 
not in ‘objective physicalistic’ terms, but in the way 
in which it exists for that person at that time”.125 We 
see here that even in later years Lewin does not 
disregard phenomenological concepts of experience 
but tries to integrate them in his field theory. That 
theory is in the service of his demand for insight into 
laws, which is why he feels that he can obtain a “sys-
tem of deduction” from the empirical examination 
of field conditions relative to the psychological situ-
ation (which, e.g., would include the needs and plans 
of an individual).126 However, it would not be con-
crete patterns of behavior of people that could be 
deduced in this way, but merely “a coherent system 
of ‘possible’ events that are in their totality an ex-
pression of the particular characteristics of this sit-
uation”.127 However, this is a bold assumption, as Le-
win himself acknowledges how quickly, in a mo-
ment, the importance of an activity can change sub-
jectively,128 which at the same time provokes a 
tremendous change in a situation in the psycholog-
ical sense. Lewin oscillates between such phe-
nomenological accentuations of subjective meanings 
as decisive reconstructions of a situation, and sys-
tems theory ideas deriving their explanatory power 
partly from everyday insights, e.g. that a river re-
presents a geographical boundary to a non-swim-
mer, necessarily interrupting his locomotion. In the 
indirect sense, boundaries are to act also as psycho-
logical resistances. Thus, he talks about weakening 
boundaries between “regions” in the living space of a 
person, which is why he makes dependence and in-
dependence of such regions an object of research. In 
the sense of macro-micro-dynamics, Lewin thus re-
                                                            
125 Kurt Lewin, Field Theory and Learning, in: Kurt Lewin, 
Resolving social conflicts & field theory in social sciences. 
Washington, DC 1997, 212-230, here 213; German: Kurt Lewin, 
Feldtheorie und Lernen (1942), in: Kurt Lewin, Feldtheorie in den 
Sozialwissenschaften. Ausgewählte theoretische Schriften, 102-
125, in H. Lück (Ed.). Bern 2012, here 103-4. 
126 Kurt Lewin, Principles of Topological Psychology, New-York‒
London 2013 (original work published 1936), 16. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Lewin, Washington, DC (see note 125), 226. 
duces the relation between historico-societal changes 
and historico-geographic conditions, respectively, to 
individual behavior and differences in the behavior 
observed: 
„There is no doubt that a weakening or loss of the boundaries 
between the different regions of the environment can lead to a 
marked fluidity of the whole field. This can be observed in the 
social field in revolutionary times when the barriers between 
groups or barriers established by prohibitions break down; or 
when a child has been brought up in strict obedience [and] is 
suddenly placed in a field in which barriers of prohibition are not 
clearly evident. The individual differences in such cases show that 
in addition to the solidity of special boundaries one always has to 
deal with the general stability of the particular life space.”129  
This translation of historico-societal conditions and 
subjective changes of modes of perception and 
action into a language partly of systems theory, as 
handled by Lewin, remains precarious. Field theory 
is bound to level out differences between societal and 
subjective borders so that specific historical media-
tion processes between society and the individual 
move out of focus. On the whole, they are neglected 
in favor of research looking for purely causal relations. 
 
The Field Concept with Brecht 
Brecht updates and interprets the field concept in 
many ways: 
 1. The field is used for the place where societal 
conditions are updated, but which the thinking 
person (also the viewer) does not regard in a 
neutral way. He does not remain outside the 
field, but must always include himself as part of 
the conditions. Brecht, with his field concept, 
creates a changed awareness of the subject-object 
problem.130       
 2. It follows from (1) that the field must be con-
sidered a constellation of relations of forces and 
dynamics. The persons thinking should see 
themselves and the alterability of the field as 
parts of this constellation. This makes the field 
the object of “intervening thinking.”   
 3. Phenomenologically, the field is interpreted 
for the scenic representation of social situations 
as a “dual aspect” of locations, referring to their 
                                                            
129 Lewin, New York‒London (see note 126), 161. 
130 At this point, David Robert must be contradicted who said that 
Brecht, by equating scientific nature and societal experiment, ran 
the risk of uncritically assuming the separation between subject 
and object (Robert 1987, p. 58). In: Robert, D. (1987) Brecht and 
the idea of a scientific theatre, Brecht Performance, 13, pp. 41-60. 
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use for social purposes. This opens up the 
historical problem of capitalist practice of 
exploitation and antagonistic conditions. 
The aspects referred to here should be explained in 
greater detail. They all revolve around Brecht’s ap-
proach that a finding about social matters should not 
simply be represented on stage but, via the relations 
among actors and the relations among actors and the 
audience, respectively, thinking should be made prac-
tical. This relation is no longer epistemologi-cal,131 
but mainly of a pedagogic and political kind. Con-
sequently, it is not only the content of thinking (a 
different truth instead of those ‘false images,’ see 
above) but the relation of thinking and acting in 
general which must be reformed. The idealistic sub-
ject-object relation which assumes a certain sover-
eignty and power of the former over the latter, is 
transformed into a field-person relation in which 
‘subjective activity’ (cf. Marx’ 1st thesis on Feuer-
bach)132 matters: 
“It is not behavior emanating from perception but the other way 
around. Consequently, perception is to emanate from behavi-
or.”133  
Making oneself able to act under the conditions in 
which one participates has become essential for 
changes in thought and, in general, growing of one’s 
personality. This is the background of Brecht’s re-
flection “about the person:” 
“’I’ am not a person. I originate any moment, do not remain any 
other. I originate in the shape of an answer. I incorporate perman-
ently what responds to what remains permanently. […] I could be 
the self-control of matter.”134  
Consequently, Brecht’s philosophy of practice 
summarizes “under thinking not the activity which 
excludes all other activities, something which philo-
sophers usually refer to as pure thinking,”135 but sub-
jective activity in the world. In this world, Brecht 
reads how even “pure thought” in idealistic philo-
sophy actually appears in history as something 
practical, for instance, when Kant refers to the 
“thing-in-itself:” 
“The question about the thing-in-itself is being raised at a time 
when, because of economic and social developments, the 
                                                            
131 See also. “How should the fact be understood that everything, truly 
everything had become a commodity? Concepts themselves had 
become commodities. The role of language was unbounded, but it 
became more and more fit for abuse“ (BFA 21 (see note 2), 437). 
132 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm. 
133 BFA 21 (see note 2), 402. 
134 Transl. by RF; BFA 21 (see note 2), 404. 
135 BFA 21 (see note 2), 409-10. 
utilization of all things is being addressed. However, the question 
was not only directed at finding new uses for things, but also 
referred to the opposition to a way of looking at things only in the 
light of their usefulness […]. The viewer thus was shown things 
which, in actual fact, were conditions, and the relations between 
people or things assumed the character of things. […] Things-in-
themselves cannot be seen because they cannot exist in them-
selves.”136  
The field concept therefore is required for ques-
tioning the socio-structural relations in human prac-
tice, which generate the “things,” in their assumed 
pure object status. The criticism in practical philo-
sophy of the object form does not deny things the 
“status of things,” but historizes the process of pro-
ducing things as the effect of field forces by recon-
structing the occurrence of things in a field. 
For this reason, Brecht concludes that the theo-
retical activity of “intervening thinking” always had 
to follow practice: “In practice you need to proceed 
step by step – theory must encompass the whole 
journey.”137 Or in other words, as Brecht could cite 
Lewin in saying the concepts used for thinking 
should not be “diluted” in capturing more extensive 
situations, i.e. they must not remove more and more 
from the concrete area of practice and instead must 
be based on properties, on the forces acting in the 
field. 
For this purpose, Brecht also uses the program of 
a criticism of language falling back on Carnap and 
Wittgenstein, where the field concept is applied in 
linguistic philosophy: 138 
About intervening sentences (around 1931): 
“(1) The (summarizing) sentences occurring or to be construed 
must be concentrated where they act as behavior, not in a 
unilateral way as reflections, expressions, reflexes. 
(2) Sentences must be moved from the minds to the black-boards. 
(3) On the blackboards, they must be supplemented by other sen-
tences which they need and with which they are combined. The 
tangents of political sentences must be drawn. This is referred to 
as ‘finding B to A.’ What needs to be found are the structures of 
conglomerates of sentences, entities. This is called ‘construing an 
axiomatic field.’ 
(4) What must be learned is: When does a sentence inter-
vene?“139  
Language criticism thus becomes a place of learning 
which Brecht, again and again, combines with in-
structions for action, like these:  
                                                            
136 BFA 21 (see note 2), 412. 
137 Brecht, London (see note 1), 48; BFA 21 (see note 2), 302. 
138 Cf. Haug, Hamburg (see note 57). 
139 BFA 21 (see note 2), 525. 
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„Find the situations in which the given sentences could appear. 
From what side could they be spoken and for what purpose?”140  
„What intervenes where? Resolution of categories. Destroying the 
‘restricted connection.’ Where does this and that lead? [...] Pro-
vision of references. Learning to quote. Learning intervening 
definitions. Balancing interests.  
[…] 
Operating with inconsistent facts and sentences. (The incon-
sistency is not to be removed but to be subjected to synthetic con-
cepts of a higher order. Find such concepts.)”141  
For, “epistemology above all must be language criti-
cism.”142 Brecht’s statement about catharsis by theo-
ry must be understood in this sense: “it [the whole 
theory] is merely a matter of practice, its purpose to 
clean up practice”.143 
       However, in practice, thinkers are never comple-
tely outside the field they try to comprehend. “It was 
relatively easy,” writes Brecht about idealistic 
philosophy, “to assert the independence of thinking 
of the way in which people secured their existence 
together and in opposition to each other, as long as 
this way was relatively stable, i.e. did not seem to 
change, resembling something like fate.”144 Recog-
nizing the dependence on the field and the new field 
dynamics of society, Brecht was interested above all 
in the new societal “materials” or “subject matters” 
(the energy resources: “petroleum” and – expressed 
in Foucault’s sense – the governmental problems: 
marriage, disease, money, war, etc.) to which people 
respond by “new relationships” and new ways of 
thinking. The “subject matters” are not “things” but 
societal relations between persons and between col-
lectives. They must appear on stage as “force fields”: 
“Petroleum balks at the five-act form, today’s catastrophes do not 
proceed in a straight line but in cyclical crises, the ‘heroes’ are 
different according to the different phases, are interchangeable, 
etc., the graph of human actions is complicated by human error, 
fate is no longer a coherent power, instead we find force fields 
with opposing currents, and the power blocks themselves show 
movement not only against one another but within themselves, 
etc., etc.”145  
The concept of field Brecht learns from Lewin’s trea-
tise ‚Kriegslandschaft‘, unlike the same concept in 
physics, turns out to be amenable to the contra-
dictions of practice. Repeatedly it makes Brecht re-
flect upon the societal use of a place: 
                                                            
140 BFA 21 (see note 2), 523. 
141 BFA 21 (see note 2), 537. 
142 BFA 21 (see note 2), 413. 
143 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 127; BFA 26 (see note 2), 458. 
144 BFA 21 (see note 2), 418. 
145 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 48; BFA 21 (see note 2), 303. 
“A hill is seen differently by a soldier than by a farmer. Whether it 
is sunny or shady is a characteristic disappearing to the soldier 
whose cover depends on whether he can be seen, and its in-
clination may be important to both observers, but important in 
very different ways, for it may not represent a major obstacle to 
climbing while jeopardizing the crops by the mere ability of water 
to flow down. A field may be small as long as it is not located 
within a barrage, a fruit tree may dominate an entire stretch of 
land by acting as a target etc.”146  
Against this backdrop, Brecht also considers his 
stage design: 
“Stage structures must emphasize the characteristic features and 
decide which of the two aspects, both of which correspond to ob-
servation, is to be taken into account. It may opt for one aspect for 
a battle scene and the other one for a bucolic scene. But what if a 
battle scene has not only soldiers but also peasants in this en-
vironment, or one such peasant is among the soldiers?”147  
Brecht provides an answer which again recalls the 
ambivalent quantum object: 
“Maybe we need that very twofold aspect.”148  
In another note, he comes back to this insight, 
emphasizing the difference between societal prac-
tices relating to the capitalist way of production: 
“The field is a potato field and a battle ground, but not simulta-
neously. A factory is a place of production and, simultaneously, of 
exploitation.”149  
The scenic representation, the way in which the 
intermingled antagonistic types of practice evade 
simple explanations is emphasized positively in re-
trospect by the example of the “Mother Courage” in 
his journal (Jan., 5, 1941): 
“going over ‘mother courage‘ i am quite pleased to see how war 
emerges as a vast field akin to the fields of modern physics, in 
which bodies experience peculiar deviations from their courses. 
any calculation about the individual based on peacetime ex-
perience proves to be unrealiable, [...however,] we are left with 
those same forces that turn peace into war, the ones that can’t be 
named.”150  
The possibility to observe causes becomes prob-
lematic not only as a result of the mix of destruction 
and production, external and internal determina-
tion. It continues to be a problem also of historical 
processes because the access of society to what used 
to be determining may be lost.  
                                                            
146 BFA 22 (see note 2), 254. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 123; BFA 26 (see note 2), 452. 
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“in the future it will perhaps be difficult to understand the 
impotence of the peoples in these wars of ours. Their causes are 
transient.”151  
Recognition proper is part of a field and, like the 
field, is a phenomenon which may disappear in his-
tory. What is interesting therefore is the use by 
Brecht of the field concept in the text following the 
quotation above. It must be read in this case as an 
opposite to an ahistoric ‘systemic’ thinking: 
“there is the phenomenon that, for lack of a better expression, i 
call the field phenomenon, these problems are always perceived 
and treated by whole peoples as field problems. ie, they are eg 
regarded as being soluble (and amenable to analysis) only in the 
capitalist field. this brings about an astonishing neutralization of 
the inner contradictions of the peoples, which do not disappear 
for a moment, yet ‘have no part to play in this field’. you can also 
put it this way: at the helm is this or that class, this or that regime, 
this or that solution is being pressed, this or that particular 
direction has been taken etc, and until the real and imaginary 
possibilities of the field have been framed, tried, exhausted and 
discredited, no other field arises. the field itself may not satisfy 
reasons (imagination may locate other fields, experience suggest 
yet others), in the currently functioning field of practice there is 
still enough reason operating for the purposes of the entire people 
and for the purposes of justifying what is happening.”152  
Only when the field concept proper is not equated 
with the whole (for instance, a system) in which 
individual forces meet, but merely means a historical 
place of use where societal conditions are updated, 
fought for and changed, and if this includes the 
thought that the subjects seeking knowledge will 
extend their practices beyond the given framework 
and use them to open up different fields that bring 
about alternative forms of collectivization, only then 
this is useful to Brecht. His questions cannot merely 
be solved by science, but turn into practical and 
political issues, questions of hegemony.153 A psy-
chology working in the service of this effort still 
needs to be found. 
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151 Brecht, New York (see note 7), 59; BFA 26 (see note 2), 378. 
152 Ibid., 59; BFA 26 (see note 2), 378. 
153  Cf. the differences in epistemological issues between Lewin 
and his colleague from Moscow, Lev S. Vygotskij (Langemeyer 
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